title: The legal status of the embryo in comparative perspective.
abstract: Almost all decisions with regard to allowing or forbidding research with and on the embryo as well as any other diagnostic invasion into the embryo depend on what kind and range of protection human life in this early stage of its development is or should be entitled to. This question is commonly referred to as that of the 'moral status' of the embryo or-with special regard to legal provisions and sanctions-as its 'legal status'. The answer to this fundamental question, however, is much debated and highly controversial, both nationally and internationally. Therefore professional and legal regulations range from the rather permissive (as in the new English Human Fertilization and Embryology Act of 1990) on the one hand to the total prohibition of embryo research or certain reproductive procedures on the other (as has recently been enacted by the German Embryo Protection Act of 1990). Thus, trying to reach consensus with regard to an embryo's legal/ethical right to protection is made all the more difficult because such an opinion is often, consciously or unconsciously, prejudiced by the desire to give researchers either more or less freedom of action, depending on one's point of view: Those who wish to see diagnostic or other experimental procedures with embryos facilitated, are inclined to deny their human quality from the very start. They base their arguments on the lack of individual personality in the preinidation phase of development, or simply on the fact that in many countries abortion is not illegal at that stage. Those who, on the contrary, find abortion as well as embryo research indefensible, believe their position well-founded by assuming that the embryo, from the time of fertilization, has the individuality and personality of a human being and thus is entitled to its own basic legal rights. Since to me neither of these extreme positions seems to be particularly cogent, I will try in this article to show the reasons for and consequences of adopting a middle course which neither leaves the embryo at free disposition nor bars any kind of diagnostic or other scientific invasion.
authors.affiliation: University of Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany.
authors.forename: A
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Eser
mesh_terms: D000029:Abortion, Legal; D033421:Beginning of Human Life; D003431:Cross-Cultural Comparison; D033041:Embryo Research; D004622:Embryo, Mammalian; D005260:Female; D033161:Government Regulation; D006806:Human Rights / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D006801:Humans; D007231:Infant, Newborn; D038622:Internationality; D019369:Life; D028681:Moral Obligations; D033281:Nontherapeutic Human Experimentation; D028723:Personhood; D011247:Pregnancy; D035845:Research Embryo Creation; D036302:Therapeutic Human Experimentation; D026712:Value of Life