Utilization of base-rate information during feeling-of-knowing judgments.
We examined whether subjects use base-rate information about item difficulty when making feeling-of-knowing judgments for items they failed to recall. First, the subjects attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions. Then, for those items they recalled incorrectly, half of the subjects received information about the normative probability of recall of each item while judging their feeling of knowing. The other subjects made their feeling-of-knowing judgments without receiving any base-rate information. Finally, all subjects had a forced-choice recognition test on those items to validate the accuracy of their feeling-of-knowing judgments. Relative to the no-base-rate information group, the base-rate group had lower feelings of knowing for normatively difficult items and higher feelings of knowing for normatively easier items. Subjects who had received base-rate information during the judgment state had greater feeling-of-knowing accuracy than subjects who did not receive base-rate information. However, even the predictions from subjects who received base-rate information were not significantly more accurate for predicting subsequent recognition than were the predictions derived from normative information alone.
Calogero
M
M
Department of Psychology, University of Washington, Seattle 98195.
Nelson
T O
TO
D000328:Adult; D003071:Cognition; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D007600:Judgment; D008297:Male; D008568:Memory; D008960:Models, Psychological; D011336:Probability