Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are 'dead'?
The article recently published in this journal by Dr B A Rix, a member of the Danish Council of Ethics (DCE), was heavily criticised by Dr David Lamb and Mr Christopher Pallis in subsequent commentaries. The editorial column by Professor Raanan Gillon also criticised the position put forward by Rix. In this article I contend that the definition of death put forward by Pallis and Lamb suffers certain philosophical shortcomings, that the position put forward by Rix deserves fuller consideration, and that Rix is not to be dismissed easily.
Catherwood
J F
JF
Department of Philosophy, Queen's University, Belfast.
D001049:Apnea / Q000150:complications; D001293:Attitude to Death; D001926:Brain Death / Q000175:diagnosis* / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence / Q000503:physiopathology; D003128:Coma / Q000150:complications; D003243:Consciousness; D004992:Ethics, Medical; D006801:Humans; D028681:Moral Obligations; D009014:Morals; D016377:Organ Transplantation; D028723:Personhood; D012068:Religion and Medicine; D012249:Rhombencephalon / Q000503:physiopathology; D009927:Tissue and Organ Procurement