title: Modal reasoning, models, and Manktelow and Over.
abstract: Manktelow and Over (1991) argue that their studies of Wason's selection task favor explanations of deontic reasoning based on mental models, but that such theories need to incorporate utilities. This theoretical note proposes a simpler explanation of the phenomena: subjects in the selection task consider only those cards that are explicitly represented in their models of the conditional, and so insight into the task depends on constructing fully explicit models. Such models for modal conditionals of the form, If p occurs then q may occur are: [formula: see text] Each line denotes a separate model, and the models represent either what is possible, or, in the deontic interpretation, what is permissible. A deontic rule is accordingly violated by the contingency: [symbol: see text] p and q, for example the rule, "If you spend more than 100 pounds, then you may take a free gift" is violated by taking the free gift (q) but not spending more than 100 pounds ([symbol: see text] p). If the rule is interpreted as a bi-conditional, then the second of the models, p and [symbol: see text] q, is also now a violation, for example spending more than 100 pounds (p) but not getting the free gift ([symbol: see text] q). Manktelow and Over's instructions lead subjects to focus on one or other of the two sorts of violations of the rule. There is accordingly no need to introduce utilities into models in order to explain the phenomena.
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, Princeton University, NJ 08544.
authors.forename: P N
authors.initials: PN
authors.lastname: Johnson-Laird
authors.forename: R M
authors.initials: RM
authors.lastname: Byrne
mesh_terms: D000328:Adult; D003071:Cognition; D003657:Decision Making; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D008128:Logic; D008297:Male; D008960:Models, Psychological; D013647:Task Performance and Analysis; D013850:Thinking