Does the autistic child have a metarepresentational deficit?
This study examines the claim that autistic children lack a "theory of mind" because of an inability to metarepresent. We argue that if autistic children have a "metarepresentational" deficit in Leslie's (1987, 1988) sense of the term, then they should have difficulty not only with mental representations such as false beliefs, but also with external representations such as photographs. Autistic children's understanding of photographic representations was tested using Zaitchik's (1990) task. This task is modelled on the false belief task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) but involves "false" photographs where a photographic representation does not conform with the current state of the real world. Like Zaitchik (1990) we found that normal 3 and 4-year-olds found this task as difficult as the false belief task. In sharp contrast, however, the autistic children in our study passed the photograph task but failed the false belief task. As both tasks require the ability to decouple, this evidence challenges the view that autistic children lack "metarepresentational" ability in Leslie's sense. However, the results leave open the question of whether autistic children have a metarepresentational ability in the different sense of the term intended by Pylyshyn (1978), that is, representing the relationship between a representation and what it represents.
Leekam
S R
SR
Institute of Social and Applied Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, U.K.
Perner
J
J
D001321:Autistic Disorder / Q000175:diagnosis / Q000523:psychology*; D001364:Awareness; D002675:Child, Preschool; D003118:Color Perception; D003210:Concept Formation; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D007092:Imagination; D007805:Language Development Disorders / Q000175:diagnosis / Q000523:psychology*; D008297:Male; D010364:Pattern Recognition, Visual; D011578:Psycholinguistics; D012660:Semantics