title: Moral absolutism and the double-effect exception: reflections on Joseph Boyle's Who is entitled to double effect?
abstract: Joseph Boyle raises important questions about the place of the double-effect exception in absolutist moral theories. His own absolutist theory (held by many, but not all, Catholic moralists), which derives from the principles that fundamental human goods may not be intentionally violated, cannot dispense with such exceptions, although he rightly rejects some widely held views about what they are. By contrast, Kantian absolutist theory, which derives from the principle that lawful freedom must not be violated, has a corollary--that it is a duty, where possible, to coerce those who try to violate lawful freedom--which makes superfluous many of the double-effect exceptions Boyle allows. Other implications of the two theories are contrasted. Inter alia, it is argued that, in Boyle's theory, that a violation of a fundamental human good can be viewed as a cost proportionate to a benefit obtained, cannot yield a double-effect exception to the prohibition of intentionally violating that good, because paying a cost cannot be unintentional.
authors.affiliation: California Institute of Technology, Pasadena 91125.
authors.forename: A
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Donagan
mesh_terms: D026688:Bioethical Issues; D002410:Catholicism; D003362:Cost-Benefit Analysis; D034723:Double Effect Principle; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D028663:Ethical Theory; D004989:Ethics; D004992:Ethics, Medical; D006801:Humans; D033182:Intention; D009014:Morals; D010686:Philosophy, Medical; D037841:Pregnant People; D012068:Religion and Medicine; D040841:Resource Allocation; D013812:Therapeutics / Q000009:adverse effects* / Q000191:economics