title: Conceptions of morality and the doctrine of double effect.
abstract: Whether one should accept a principle like DDE cannot be settled independent of one's more general moral theory. In this, I take it, I agree with Professor Boyle, though I do not think he has shown that DDE has a role only in his particular form of absolutism. Still, since his theory does require DDE, an important question is what the alternatives are--whether we must choose between this absolutism and either utilitarianism or intuitionism. A form of contractualism, the requirements of which derive to a large extent from institutionally or conventionally established rights, is sketched here as an attractive alternative. It does not lead, so far as I can see, to DDE.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, University of Houston, Texas 77204.
authors.forename: W N
authors.initials: WN
authors.lastname: Nelson
mesh_terms: D026688:Bioethical Issues; D002410:Catholicism; D032982:Contracts; D034723:Double Effect Principle; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D028781:Ethical Relativism; D028663:Ethical Theory; D004989:Ethics; D004992:Ethics, Medical; D006801:Humans; D007258:Informed Consent; D033182:Intention; D009014:Morals; D010686:Philosophy, Medical; D037841:Pregnant People; D012068:Religion and Medicine; D018570:Risk Assessment; D013812:Therapeutics / Q000009:adverse effects*; D026712:Value of Life