Clinical syndromes are not God's gift to cognitive neuropsychology: a reply to a rebuttal to an answer to a response to the case against syndrome-based research.
In this paper we consider several issues about single-patient versus syndrome-based research in response to E. Zurif, D. Swinney, and J. A. Fodor's (1991, Brain and Cognition, 16, 198-210) criticism of A. Caramazza and W. Badecker (1989, Brain and Cognition, 10, 256-295). We argue that these authors have failed to provide convincing arguments in favor of syndrome-based research. In particular, we show that the specific example--a study by D. Swinney, E. Zurif, and J. Nicol (1989, Journal of Cognitive Neurosciences, 1, 25-37)--given by these authors as a demonstration of the usefulness of syndrome-based research to inform theories of normal language processing does not in fact serve this purpose.
Caramazza
A
A
Department of Cognitive Science, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218.
Badecker
W
W
D001039:Aphasia, Broca / Q000503:physiopathology; D001925:Brain Damage, Chronic / Q000503:physiopathology*; D001931:Brain Mapping; D002540:Cerebral Cortex / Q000503:physiopathology; D003072:Cognition Disorders / Q000503:physiopathology*; D004292:Dominance, Cerebral / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D009483:Neuropsychological Tests; D012106:Research; D013577:Syndrome