The representational bias of acquired memory processes.
The notion that some memory processes are acquired has been around for at least two thousand years. However, acquired memory processes have been made the object of scientific investigation in only the past two decades. Traditionally, psychologists have assumed that acquired memory processes are equally effective across the entire range of memory tasks. This article reviews research that has investigated whether these processes are equally effective across tasks or are more effective for just certain tasks. The review indicates that most, if not all, acquired memory processes are biased to deal effectively just certain kinds of mental representation. The article proposes that these processes are representationally biased because (1) they activate basic memory processes (e.g. imagery, rehearsal) which themselves are biased to process certain representational attributes and because (2) their use of basic processes follows a sequence required by particular memory tasks. Increased understanding of the representational bias of acquired processes may be seen to enable better control of memory performance and to foster more powerful investigations of memory phenomena.
Herrmann
D J
DJ
Laboratory of Socio-environmental Studies, National Institute of Mental Health, Washington, D.C.
D001288:Attention; D006801:Humans; D007092:Imagination; D011939:Mental Recall; D011214:Practice, Psychological; D012153:Retention, Psychology