Internally represented forces may be cognitively penetrable: comment on Freyd, Pantzer, and Cheng (1988).
Freyd, Pantzer, and Cheng (1988) provided considerable evidence for the proposition that people can represent underlying forces within static scenes. However, they explicitly assumed that their observed memory shifts were the result of perceptually modular information processing. For several reasons, I suggest herein that this assumption of cognitive impenetrability is a dubious one. The assumption is challenged by recent empirical findings, some theoretical considerations, and calculations that show that the observed effects are minute when compared with those expected by means of physical forces. Three explanations for the evidence are proposed, including the alternative hypothesis that although people do represent static physical forces, these representations can be almost completely overridden by the conscious intention to remember an object's precise location.
Ranney
M
M
University of California, Berkeley 94720
D003071:Cognition; D006801:Humans; D008568:Memory; D008960:Models, Psychological; D009949:Orientation; D010465:Perception; D055585:Physical Phenomena; D010825:Physics; D014796:Visual Perception