Designing health insurance information for the Medicare beneficiary: a policy synthesis.
Can Medicare beneficiaries make rational and informed decisions about their coverage under the Medicare program? Recent policy developments in the Medicare program have been based on the theory of competition in medical care. One of the key assumptions of the competitive model is the free flow of adequate information, enabling the consumer to make an informed choice from among the various sellers of a particular product. Options for Medicare beneficiaries in supplementing their basic Medicare coverage include the purchase of private supplementary insurance policies or enrollment in a Medicare HMO. These consumers, in a complex health insurance market, have only limited information available to them because many health plans do not make adequate comparable product information available. Moreover, since the introduction of the Medicare HMO option, the long-range plan for management of the Medicare budget has become based on the large-scale voluntary enrollment of beneficiaries into capitated health plans. The policy instrument that has been used to improve beneficiary decisions on how to supplement Medicare coverage is the informational or educational program. This synthesis presents findings regarding the relative effectiveness of different types of health insurance information programs for the Medicare beneficiary in an effort to promote practical use of the most effective types of information.
Davidson
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RAND/UCLA Center for Health Policy Study, Santa Monica 90406-2138.
D003256:Community Participation / Q000191:economics*; D003657:Decision Making; D003669:Deductibles and Coinsurance; D004465:Economic Competition; D006077:Government Agencies; D007255:Information Services / Q000458:organization & administration*; D007342:Insurance Benefits; D006278:Medicare / Q000458:organization & administration*; D015397:Program Evaluation; D014481:United States