title: When caesarean section operations imposed by a court are justified.
abstract: Court-ordered caesarean sections against the explicit wishes of the pregnant woman have been criticised as violations of the woman's fundamental right to autonomy and to the inviolability of the person--particularly, so it is argued, because the fetus in utero is not yet a person. This paper examines the logic of this position and argues that once the fetus has passed a certain stage of neurological development it is a person, and that then the whole issue becomes one of balancing of rights: the right-to-life of the fetal person against the right to autonomy and inviolability of the woman; and that the fetal right usually wins.
authors.affiliation: University of Victoria, Canada.
authors.forename: E H
authors.initials: EH
authors.lastname: Kluge
mesh_terms: D033421:Beginning of Human Life; D002585:Cesarean Section; D005260:Female; D005333:Fetus; D006806:Human Rights / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D006801:Humans; D007258:Informed Consent; D033222:Judicial Role; D019369:Life; D033261:Maternal-Fetal Relations; D028681:Moral Obligations; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D028723:Personhood; D011247:Pregnancy; D037841:Pregnant People; D026712:Value of Life