Self-determination, incompetence, and medical jurisprudence.
Philosophers and others have criticized the courts for ascribing a right of self-determination to severe incompetents. I defend ascription of a right of self-determination to these incompetents against both conceptual and normative attacks. I argue that a court need make no conceptual error when it ascribes a right of self-determination to a being who never had capacity for rational choice, and I argue that proper judicial deference to reflective conventional morality supports ascription of a right of self-determination to severe incompetents.
Strudler
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Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland, College Park 20742.
D026688:Bioethical Issues; D004992:Ethics, Medical; D005555:Forensic Psychiatry / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D006806:Human Rights / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D006801:Humans; D008607:Intellectual Disability; D033222:Judicial Role; D007872:Legal Guardians; D008020:Life Support Care / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D010358:Patient Participation; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D028723:Personhood; D013244:Sterilization, Involuntary