title: Behavior-dependent contexts for repeated plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma: II. Dynamical aspects of the evolution of cooperation.
abstract: Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma models are proposed in which, at any trial, the probability of staying in the game depends on the outcome of the previous trial. If a player's choice depends on its own play (cooperate or defect) at the previous trial, it becomes possible for cooperative strategies to increase when rare in a population of egoists. A dynamic analysis is used to demonstrate that stable polymorphisms may result, and may involve more strategies than just Tit-for-Tat and all-Defect. The tendency for clustering among like strategists to enhance their initial increase when rare is also explored dynamically.
authors.affiliation: Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, CA 94305.
authors.forename: M W
authors.initials: MW
authors.lastname: Feldman
authors.forename: E A
authors.initials: EA
authors.lastname: Thomas
mesh_terms: D001519:Behavior; D005075:Biological Evolution; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D008433:Mathematics; D008957:Models, Genetic; D011110:Polymorphism, Genetic