title: Moral community and the responsibility of scientists.
abstract: There is a quaint term in English for describing the science of the care and production of domestic animals--animal husbandry. While not particularly useful as a description of the scientific methods by which such production is achieved, the term does capture what I believe is the moral ethos which ought to govern the scientific treatment of animals in the context of scientific experimentation. While great attention has been given to the claims of some philosophers and animal welfare advocates that animals have rights, less attention has been paid either to alternative foundations for conferring moral standing on animals, or, on the nature of the duties and responsibilities that would arise if it were true that animals could be said to have moral rights. I will argue that animals, or most animals, cannot reasonably be said to have moral rights. And even if one decides to stretch this term to include all animals, it cannot be done without conflating what I believe to be important differences in the moral standing of humans and animals. Rather than attempt to motivate humane treatment and reduction in animal use on the basis of animal rights I argue that scientists have an obligation, based upon their duty to care for the helpless and the powerless who can nonetheless be wronged, to act as stewards toward animals. Husbandry carries the connotation of care for a household and I believe this is the ethos that should pervade the animal laboratory or storage facility.
authors.forename: A
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Caplan
mesh_terms: D000822:Animal Husbandry; D000826:Animal Testing Alternatives; D000827:Animal Welfare; D000818:Animals; D009014:Morals