ESS equations sometimes do not specify an ESS.
The equations used to find an evolutionarily stable strategy in the basic game theory model (Maynard Smith, 1974, 1982; Maynard Smith & Price, 1973), and in sexual conflict models (Maynard Smith, 1977; Parker, 1979) do not, in fact, specify an ESS when the expected number of contests entered is not the same for each strategy. This means that the conclusions of many game theory models may be incorrect. This is particularly likely to be true when the mean durations of contests for different strategies are not the same, or when the probability that an individual enters a contest is not the same for all strategies. New ESS equations are developed which incorporate the expected number of contests entered.
Clark
S J
SJ
The Rockefeller University, Field Research Center, Millbrook, New York 12545.
D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D005260:Female; D005716:Game Theory; D008297:Male; D008957:Models, Genetic; D010641:Phenotype