Another look at sex stereotypes and social judgments: an analysis of the social perceiver's use of subjective probabilities.
Locksley, Borgida, Brekke, and Hepburn (1980) assert that subjects fall prey to the base-rate fallacy when they make stereotype-related trait judgments. They found that subjects ignored their stereotypes when trait judgments were made in the presence of trait-related behavioral information. The present article reexamines those findings with respect to two issues: (a) the use of a normative criterion in comparison with subjects' judgments and (b) the level of analysis (group vs. individual) of subjects' judgments. We conducted a replication of the Locksley et al. (1980) Study 2, and the results were examined with respect to these two issues. We found no support for the base-rate fallacy. When a Bayesian normative criterion was constructed for each subject based on the subject's own stereotype judgments and was compared with assertiveness judgments made in the presence of individuating information, there was no evidence that subjects ignored or underused their stereotypes as the base-rate fallacy predicts.
D001242:Assertiveness; D001499:Bayes Theorem; D005260:Female; D005783:Gender Identity; D006801:Humans; D007062:Identification, Psychological; D008297:Male; D012718:Set, Psychology; D012945:Social Values; D013240:Stereotyping