Do minds exist in species other than our own?
An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.
D000818:Animals; D001364:Awareness; D001522:Behavior, Animal; D005075:Biological Evolution; D002675:Child, Preschool; D003071:Cognition; D003243:Consciousness; D006801:Humans; D007223:Infant; D007802:Language; D002679:Pan troglodytes; D010684:Philosophy; D011582:Psychological Theory; D002666:Psychology, Child; D013045:Species Specificity