The time of a conscious sensory experience and mind-brain theories.
Libet et al. and Popper & Eccles have the view that some single hypothesis about the time of a conscious sensory experience has certain consequences for various mind-brain theories. The view involves a fundamental inconsistency, which may cast doubt on experimental findings, and two hypotheses rather than one. The preferable hypothesis is doubtful. The preferable hypothesis has been thought to have mind-brain consequences principally because it has not been distinguished from a different hypothesis. The preferable hypothesis in fact does not have the supposed mind-brain consequences. The different hypothesis, which in fact does have the given consequences, is entirely unacceptable.
D001921:Brain / Q000502:physiology*; D003243:Consciousness / Q000502:physiology*; D005073:Evoked Potentials, Somatosensory; D006801:Humans; D008959:Models, Neurological; D009474:Neurons / Q000502:physiology; D010812:Physical Stimulation; D012677:Sensation / Q000502:physiology*; D013997:Time Factors