Killing and letting die: hidden value assumptions.
In this paper I argue for several related theses: first, that the distinction between killing and letting die, as it is drawn by ordinary persons in ordinary contexts, is more complex than is generally understood; second, that the key feature of this complexity lies in the presence of a hidden normative component in what appears to be a straightforwardly descriptive distinction; and, third, that this complexity renders the killing/letting die distinction an inadequate and hazardous guide for moral reasoning.
D003643:Death; D034723:Double Effect Principle; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D028663:Ethical Theory; D004989:Ethics; D005065:Euthanasia; D006708:Homicide; D006801:Humans; D033182:Intention; D028681:Moral Obligations; D009014:Morals; D010684:Philosophy; D012945:Social Values; D028761:Withholding Treatment