title: Eccles's physiological evidence for a self-conscious mind.
abstract: Eccles cites three items of physiological evidence for a self-conscious mind: experiments by Libet, showing that consciousness can antedate sensory experience; slow build-up of the readiness potential, showing that the mind is weak; that brain events are scattered, but consciousness is a unity. I argue that none of the three items has any significance: the first is a confusion about the experimental evidence; the second indicates weak physical forces, no mind; the third replaces visible structures by intangible influences. Thus, these physiological arguments do not support the contention that non-physical influences are at work.
mesh_terms: D001921:Brain / Q000502:physiology*; D002540:Cerebral Cortex / Q000502:physiology; D003243:Consciousness / Q000502:physiology*; D004292:Dominance, Cerebral / Q000502:physiology; D006801:Humans; D009434:Neural Pathways / Q000502:physiology; D012677:Sensation / Q000502:physiology; D012718:Set, Psychology; D012867:Skin / Q000294:innervation