Consciousness: perspectives from symbolic and connectionist AI.
While consciousness has not been a major concern of most AI researchers, some theorists have tried to explore how computational models might explain consciousness. I explore how far computational models might go in explaining consciousness, focusing on three aspects of conscious mental states: their intrinsic intentionality, the awareness a subject has of the contents of these intentional states, and the distinctive qualitative character of these states. I describe and evaluate strategies for developing connectionist systems that satisfy these aspects of consciousness.
Bechtel
W
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Department of Philosophy, Washington University, St Louis, MO 63130, USA.
D000818:Animals; D001185:Artificial Intelligence; D001364:Awareness / Q000502:physiology*; D003243:Consciousness / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D009042:Motivation; D016571:Neural Networks, Computer; D011603:Psychophysiology; D013561:Symbolism