title: Metaphysics and medical ethics.
abstract: I take issue with Frank Leavitt's sketch of a pragmatic criterion for the relevance of metaphysics to medical ethics. I argue that appeal to the potential for confusion generated by metaphysical subtlety establishes a need for better communication rather than shows philosophical insight beside the point. I demonstrate that the proposed Criterion of Relevance has absurd consequences, and I claim that the relevance of philosophical doctrines, whether ethical or metaphysical, is best accounted for in terms of improved understanding.
authors.affiliation: Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.
authors.forename: C
authors.initials: C
authors.lastname: Parkin
mesh_terms: D003657:Decision Making; D028663:Ethical Theory; D004992:Ethics, Medical; D008128:Logic; D008678:Metaphysics; D009014:Morals