title: The physician self-referral dilemma: enforcing antitrust law as a solution.
abstract: As health care reform pervades the United States, lawmakers have subjected physician self-referrals to heightened scrutiny. Recent evidence indicates that sending patients to facilities in which a physician has an ownership interest often causes overutilization, overpricing, and lower quality of care. This Note analyzes how physician self-referral arrangements can have negative effects on competition. To combat the adverse effects, the Note examines how enforcing antitrust laws can ameliorate the self-referral dilemma and aid in restoring competition to the health care market. This solution will maintain the doctor's right to invest while protecting the patient's vulnerability.
authors.forename: J E
authors.initials: JE
authors.lastname: Mathews
mesh_terms: D016363:Antitrust Laws; D003362:Cost-Benefit Analysis / Q000191:economics; D004465:Economic Competition / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D033161:Government Regulation; D006801:Humans; D009042:Motivation; D018584:Physician Self-Referral / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D011785:Quality Assurance, Health Care / Q000191:economics; D014481:United States