title: Multiple trial two strategy conflicts.
abstract: Much work has been done on iterated conflicts where the one-trial conflict is the Prisoner's Dilemma. The present paper is concerned with an iterated contest where the underlying contest has two pure strategies and the underlying payoff matrix is general; this therefore includes the Prisoner's Dilemma as a special case. By limiting the player's memory severely we can almost completely specify the Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) of the two- and infinite-trial conflicts derived from this underlying payoff matrix.
authors.affiliation: Department of Applied Statistics, University of Reading, U.K.
authors.forename: J C
authors.initials: JC
authors.lastname: Whittaker
authors.forename: C
authors.initials: C
authors.lastname: Cannings
mesh_terms: D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D005716:Game Theory; D015233:Models, Statistical