Relative consistency and subjects' "theories" in domains such as naive physics: common research difficulties illustrated by Cooke and Breedin.
While augmenting the literature with data that further exhibit context-specific responding to qualitative motion problems, Cooke and Breedin (1994) exhibit common theoretical and methodological difficulties that undermine their conclusions. Herein, these flaws are explicated and contrasted with features of studies that avoid the pitfalls of (1) theoretical vagueness, (2) overly coarse data aggregation, (3) nondiagnostic, errorful assessment items, and (4) imprecise measures of the variety of (mis/)conceptions (e.g., of "impetus," or inertia). The difficulties call into question Cooke and Breedin's claims that impetus ideas play minor roles in performance and that "naive theories" of motion are largely constructed on line. Because such confusion often arises from the polysemy of "theory," some empirical criteria for "theoryness" are discussed, including subjects' conceptual, temporal, and coherence-based consistencies (regarding researchers' models and isomorphs). While naive physics may be idiosyncratic, baroque, context-driven, and apparently inconsistent, it might (additionally) be based upon fairly a priori, systematic, and temporally stable information.
Ranney
M
M
University of California, Berkeley 94720.
D003210:Concept Formation; D006801:Humans; D009039:Motion Perception; D009949:Orientation; D055585:Physical Phenomena; D010825:Physics; D011340:Problem Solving; D013028:Space Perception