title: Propositional reasoning by mental models? Simple to refute in principle and in practice.
abstract: Two experiments compared the predictions of mental-models theory with a mental-logic theory. Results show that people do not make fallacious inferences predicted by mental-models theory but not predicted by mental-logic theory and that people routinely make many valid inferences predicted by mental-logic theory that should be too difficult on mental-models theory. Thus, the mental-logic theory accounts better for the data. A difference between the two theories concerning predictions about the order in which inferences are made was also investigated. The data clearly favor the mental-logic theory. It is argued that the mental-logic theory provides the more plausible description of the actual psychological processes in propositional reasoning.
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, Baruch College, City University of New York, New York 10010.
authors.forename: D P
authors.initials: DP
authors.lastname: O'Brien
authors.forename: M D
authors.initials: MD
authors.lastname: Braine
authors.forename: Y
authors.initials: Y
authors.lastname: Yang
mesh_terms: D003071:Cognition; D006801:Humans; D008128:Logic; D008960:Models, Psychological; D011340:Problem Solving