What is folk psychology?
Eliminativism has been a major focus of discussion in the philosophy of mind for the last two decades. According to eliminativists, beliefs and other intentional states are the posits of a folk theory of mind standardly called "folk psychology". That theory, they claim, is radically false and hence beliefs and other intentional states do not exist. We argue that the expression "folk psychology" is ambiguous in an important way. On the one hand, "folk psychology" is used by many philosophers and cognitive scientists to refer to an internally represented theory of human psychology exploited in the prediction of behavior. On the other hand, "folk psychology" is used to refer to the theory of mind implicit in our everyday talk about mental states. We then argue that sorting out the conceptual and terminological confusion surrounding "folk psychology" has major consequences for the eliminativism debate. In particular, if certain models of cognition turn out to be true, then on some readings of "folk psychology" the arguments for elimination collapse.
Philosophy Department, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903-0270.
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D003071:Cognition; D003657:Decision Making; D006801:Humans; D008606:Mental Processes; D011939:Mental Recall; D011582:Psychological Theory; D012718:Set, Psychology; D012938:Social Perception