title: On the morality of deception--does method matter? A reply to David Bakhurst.
abstract: Does it signify morally whether a deception is achieved by a lie or some other way? David Bakhurst has challenged my view that it can signify. Here I counter his criticisms--firstly, by clarifying the terminology: What counts as a lie? Secondly, by exploring further what makes lying wrong. Bakhurst maintains that lying is wrong in that it infringes autonomy--and other deceiving stratagems, he says, do so equally. I maintain that lying is wrong in that it endangers trust--and other types of deceiving stratagems do not do so equally. Lying to patients, I contend, is an abuse of their trust. Other forms of their intentional deception need not be so, although, in our autonomy-minded culture, they are likely to be so.
authors.affiliation: University of Leeds.
authors.forename: J
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Jackson
mesh_terms: D026686:Beneficence; D008192:Deception; D030881:Disclosure; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D004992:Ethics, Medical; D006801:Humans; D033182:Intention; D028681:Moral Obligations; D009014:Morals; D026706:Paternalism; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D035502:Trust; D028722:Virtues