Risky decision making and allocation of resources for leukemia and AIDS programs.
Traditional judgment and decision-making paradigms were expanded to include differential reactions to persons with leukemia or AIDS. Experiments 1 and 2 adopted Tversky and Kahneman's risky-decision-making task and found support for different value functions for the 2 patient groups when choosing between treatment programs. From these results, the subjective value of saving a fixed number of lives appears to be greater for persons with leukemia than for persons with AIDS. Experiment 3 provided additional data concerning differential perceptions of the causes of AIDS. This proved to be a useful means of classifying Ss who did and did not devalue the lives of persons with AIDS.
Department of Psychology, University of Iowa, Iowa City 52242.
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IP
Levin
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DP
Chapman
D000163:Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome / Q000523:psychology*; D000328:Adult; D017281:Cost of Illness; D003657:Decision Making; D005260:Female; D015276:Health Care Rationing; D006801:Humans; D007938:Leukemia / Q000523:psychology*; D008297:Male; D018579:Patient Selection; D011788:Quality of Life; D040841:Resource Allocation; D012309:Risk-Taking; D012945:Social Values