On the neurophysiology of consciousness: Part II. Constraining the semantic problem.
The main idea in this series of essays is that subjective awareness (more precisely, what I call C) depends upon the intralaminar nuclei of each thalamus (hereafter, ILN). This implies that the internal structure and external relations of ILN make subjective awareness possible. An array of material relevant to this proposal was briefly reviewed in Part I (Bogen, 1995). This Part II considers in more detail some semantic aspects and a bit of philosophic background as these pertain to propositions 0, 1, and 2 of Part I. Part II should be read in conjunction with Part I.
Department of Neurological Surgery, University of Southern California, Los Angeles 90033, USA.
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Bogen
D000818:Animals; D001364:Awareness / Q000502:physiology*; D001921:Brain / Q000502:physiology; D001931:Brain Mapping; D003243:Consciousness / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D009415:Nerve Net / Q000502:physiology; D009434:Neural Pathways / Q000502:physiology; D012660:Semantics; D013045:Species Specificity; D013787:Thalamic Nuclei / Q000502:physiology*