title: Privacy and autonomy: from Warren and Brandeis to Roe and Cruzan.
abstract: Warren and Brandeis' tort against invasion of privacy had chiefly a social goal: to enlist the courts to reinforce the norm of civility. Years later in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), the Supreme Court announced a constitutional right of privacy that was personal in focus. Here and in subsequent rulings on abortion and the "right to die, " it became apparent that Warren and Brandeis' Victorian "right to be let alone" had metamorphosed into a right to autonomy, whose amoeboid contours made prediction or even description a tricky business. But privacy is an unsatisfactory proxy for autonomy, and perhaps for this reason has dwindled in importance as a rationale in these areas.
authors: Department of Political Science, Baruch College, New York, N.Y., USA.
authors: T
authors: T
authors: Halper
mesh_terms: D000029:Abortion, Legal; D030881:Disclosure; D004992:Ethics, Medical; D005260:Female; D033161:Government Regulation; D006801:Humans; D016365:Liability, Legal; D008297:Male; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D011247:Pregnancy; D018907:Privacy / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D012297:Right to Die / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D035521:Supreme Court Decisions; D014481:United States