Health as an objective value.
Variants on two approaches to the concept of health have dominated the philosophy of medicine, here referred to as 'reductionist' and 'relativist'. These two approaches share the basic assumption that the concept of health cannot be both based on an empirical biological foundation and be evaluative, and thus adopt either the view that it is 'objective' or evaluative. It is here argued that there are a subset of value concepts that are formed in recognition of certain fundamental facts about living organisms, among which is the concept of health. These are not yet moral concepts, but they are 'normative' or 'evaluative'. The view is defended that health, so understood, is a fundamental concept in the process of medical diagnosis and treatment.
Lennox
J G
JG
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA.
D001294:Attitude to Health; D003210:Concept Formation; D003933:Diagnosis; D006262:Health; D006801:Humans; D010686:Philosophy, Medical; D012945:Social Values; D013812:Therapeutics