Beyond belief bias: reasoning from conceptual structures by mental models manipulation.
Mental models constitute an alternative to the rule-based systems in the explanation of human reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1983). In this paper, we claim that the concept of believability generally used to categorize content and context effects is of little use within a semantic theory. Thus, we propose the use of categories that are directly extracted from subjective relations among concepts within the reasoning problem. We demonstrate that manipulations based on this kind of categorization produce predictable patterns of responses in reasoning problems. We present two experiments to test our predictions, using conditional and syllogistic reasoning problems, and in both cases, we demonstrate the influence of conceptual knowledge not only in natural contexts, but also in experimentally created artificial contexts.
Santamaría
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C
Dpto. de Psicología Cognitiva, Universidad de La Laguna, Campus de Guajara, Tenerife, Spain. csantamaria@ull.es
García-Madruga
J A
JA
Carretero
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M
D000328:Adult; D003210:Concept Formation; D005260:Female; D005793:Generalization, Psychological; D006801:Humans; D008128:Logic; D008297:Male; D011340:Problem Solving; D012660:Semantics; D012718:Set, Psychology