title: Game theory and reciprocity in some extensive form experimental games.
abstract: We examine decision making in two-person extensive form game trees using nine treatments that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information. Our objective is to establish replicable principles of cooperative versus noncooperative behavior that involve the use of signaling, reciprocity, and backward induction strategies, depending on the availability of dominated direct punishing strategies and the probability of repeated interaction with the same partner. Contrary to the predictions of game theory, we find substantial support for cooperation under complete information even in various single-play treatments.
authors.affiliation: Economic Science Laboratory, University of Arizona, Tucson 85721-0108, USA.
authors.forename: K A
authors.initials: KA
authors.lastname: McCabe
authors.forename: S J
authors.initials: SJ
authors.lastname: Rassenti
authors.forename: V L
authors.initials: VL
authors.lastname: Smith
mesh_terms: D001499:Bayes Theorem; D003657:Decision Making; D004467:Economics; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D008960:Models, Psychological