Human cloning: a case of no harm done?
Some have objected to the laboratory cloning of human preembryos on the grounds that the procedure would violate the dignity of and respect owed to human preembryos. Others have argued that human cloning ought be permitted if it will predictably benefit, or at least not burden, individuals who are, unlike the human preembryo, clearly entitled to our respect and concern. Taking this latter position, the legal theorist John A. Robertson has argued that, since cloning does not harm anyone who is clearly entitled to our respect and concern, it should be permitted. In particular, the offspring of cloning, he argues, cannot be genuinely harmed by cloning, since they owe their very existence to the cloning procedure. In this paper, I argue that cloning coupled with its related procedures does in fact place the flesh and blood human offspring of cloning at risk of genuine harm. I thus provide a basis for questioning the moral permissibility of cloning and its related technologies without implying that the human preembryo has dignity or is owed respect.
Roberts
M A
MA
Department of Philosophy and Religion, College of New Jersey, Trenton, USA.
D001675:Bioethics; D002999:Clone Cells; D033041:Embryo Research; D004622:Embryo, Mammalian; D005818:Genetic Engineering; D006806:Human Rights; D006801:Humans; D028723:Personhood; D012099:Reproductive Techniques; D018570:Risk Assessment; D035781:Siblings