The developmental gap in phenomenal experience: a comment on J. G. Taylor's "cortical activity and the explanatory gap".
J. G. Taylor advances an empirically testable local neural network model to understand the neural correlates of phenomenal experience. Taylor's model is better able to explain the presence (i.e., persistence, latency, and seamlessness) and unity of phenomenal consciousness which support the idea that consciousness is coherent, undivided, and centered. However, Taylor fails to offer a satisfactory explanation of the nonlinear relationship between local and global neural systems. In addition, the ontological assumptions that PE is immediate, intrinsic, and incorrigible limit an understanding of the different experiential forms consciousness takes during neurobehavioral development. Recent studies suggest that neurobehavioral development is discontinuous and that judgment emerges under conditions of uncertainty to render feeling and perception in equivalent terms of energy and behavior. Approaching the problem of phenomenal experience from a developmental perspective may help resolve the paradox of feeling infinitely close as well as distant from one's self.
College of Liberal Arts, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo 93407, USA.
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Dalton
D001364:Awareness / Q000502:physiology; D002540:Cerebral Cortex / Q000502:physiology*; D003243:Consciousness / Q000502:physiology*; D004644:Emotions / Q000502:physiology; D006801:Humans; D016571:Neural Networks, Computer; D009474:Neurons / Q000502:physiology; D010465:Perception / Q000502:physiology*