title: The DSM's theory-neutral nosology is scientifically progressive: response to Follette and Houts (1996).
abstract: W. C. Follette and A. C. Houts (1996) argued on philosophy-of-science grounds that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is scientifically unprogressive and should be replaced by competing theory-laden manuals. The author responds to their various arguments as follows: (a) The ways things can go wrong with the mind are inherently diverse, so failure to reduce the DSM's categories to 1 parsimonious theory is not necessarily scientifically unprogressive; (b) it is empirically untrue that growth in the number of a taxonomy's categories is inconsistent with scientific progress; (c) progress in theoretically fragmented fields requires shared theory-neutral categories, not theory-laden definitions of basic concepts; (d) at present in the mental health field, theoretical integration is scientifically more progressive than competition, and integration is promoted by the DSM's theory-neutral nosology; and (e) Follette and Houts's proposed behaviorist alternative to the DSM is incoherent.
authors.affiliation: School of Social Work, Rutgers, State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, USA. jcw2@columbia.edu
authors.forename: J C
authors.initials: JC
authors.lastname: Wakefield
mesh_terms: D006801:Humans; D008370:Manuals as Topic / Q000592:standards*; D001523:Mental Disorders / Q000145:classification*; D011570:Psychiatry / Q000592:standards*; D009626:Terminology as Topic; D014481:United States