Mentalism, mechanisms, and medical analogues: reply to Wakefield (1998).
J. C. Wakefield's (1998) critique of W. C. Follette and A. C. Houts's (1996) article is addressed by raising questions about (a) mentalism as a framework for studying psychopathology, (b) the nature of inferred mechanisms and the process of making such inferences, and (c) the accuracy of claiming that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American Psychiatric Association) expansion is analogous to the success of physical medicine. The authors argue that Wakefield's analysis of mental disorders leads to the conclusion that the modern DSMs are not reflective of the progress of physical medicine.
Houts
A C
AC
Department of Psychology, University of Memphis, Tennessee 38152, USA. ahouts@latte.memphis.edu
Follette
W C
WC
D006801:Humans; D001523:Mental Disorders / Q000145:classification / Q000209:etiology / Q000503:physiopathology / Q000523:psychology; D019222:Mind-Body Relations, Metaphysical; D011570:Psychiatry / Q000592:standards* / Q000639:trends; D009626:Terminology as Topic; D014481:United States