title: Financial incentives and drug spending in managed care.
abstract: This study estimates the impact of patient financial incentives on the use and cost of prescription drugs in the context of differing physician payment mechanisms. A large data set was developed that covers persons in managed care who pay varying levels of cost sharing and whose physicians are compensated under two different models: independent practice association (IPA)-model and network-model health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Our results indicate that higher patient copayments for prescription drugs are associated with lower drug spending in IPA models (in which physicians are not at risk for drug costs) but have little effect in network models (in which physicians bear financial risk for all prescribing behavior).
authors: Center for Health Policy, Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics, University of Pennsylvania, USA.
authors: A L
authors: AL
authors: Hillman
authors: M V
authors: MV
authors: Pauly
authors: J J
authors: JJ
authors: Escarce
authors: K
authors: K
authors: Ripley
authors: M
authors: M
authors: Gaynor
authors: J
authors: J
authors: Clouse
authors: R
authors: R
authors: Ross
mesh_terms: D000328:Adult; D017047:Cost Sharing / Q000191:economics*; D016527:Drug Costs; D004363:Drug Utilization / Q000191:economics*; D005260:Female; D006279:Health Maintenance Organizations / Q000191:economics; D006801:Humans; D007193:Independent Practice Associations / Q000191:economics; D007356:Insurance, Pharmaceutical Services / Q000191:economics; D016018:Least-Squares Analysis; D016015:Logistic Models; D008297:Male; D008329:Managed Care Programs / Q000191:economics*; D008875:Middle Aged; D010816:Physician Incentive Plans / Q000191:economics*; D012051:Reimbursement Mechanisms; D014481:United States