Similarity between hypotheses and evidence.
We explore two novel consequences of similarity-based likelihood judgment. In Section I, we distinguish between the evidence on which judgments are based and the hypotheses that serve as the objects of judgment. The location of a feature, whether in the evidence or the hypotheses, influences the perceived similarity between evidence and hypotheses and consequently yields judgments that are inconsistent with the requirements of probability theory. In Section II, we examine judgment of disjunctive hypotheses. For certain types of disjunctions, the assessment of similarity produces consistent nonmonotonicities: the support of a disjunction is smaller than that of one of its components. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings in terms of support theory and the principle of context independence.
Rottenstreich
Y
Y
Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago,IL 60637, USA. yuval.rottenstreich@gsb.uchicago.edu
Brenner
L
L
Sood
S
S
D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D007600:Judgment; D008297:Male; D015233:Models, Statistical; D011336:Probability