Should physicians be permitted to 'balance bill' patients?
This paper studies the efficiency effects of physician fees when the insurer (possibly the government) pays a fee for each procedure, and the doctor may supplement the fee by an extra charge to the patient, a practice known as 'balance billing.' Monopolistically competitive physicians can discriminate among patients on the basis of both price and quality. Equilibria with and without balance billing are compared. The paper analyzes and recommends a new fee policy, a form of payer 'fee discrimination.'
Department of Economics, Boston University, MA 02215.
J
J
Glazer
T G
TG
McGuire
D017047:Cost Sharing / Q000592:standards*; D017598:Efficiency, Organizational / Q000191:economics; D005251:Fees, Medical / Q000592:standards*; D016345:Medicare Part B / Q000191:economics; D015233:Models, Statistical; D010350:Patient Credit and Collection / Q000191:economics*; D010820:Physicians / Q000191:economics; D011787:Quality of Health Care / Q000191:economics; D011907:Rate Setting and Review / Q000592:standards*; D014481:United States