Well-being: a philosophical basis for health services.
This paper develops and defends the claim that the promotion of human well-being is a philosophical basis or rationale for health services. It first sketches a case for this thesis, then defends it against various objections arising from the contrary position, here dubbed The Sceptical View. Later sections of the paper elaborate on the meaning of 'well-being', the nature of well-being, and the scope of appropriate health service concern with well-being. In particular, distinctions are made between 'thick' and 'thin' well-being, and between well-being and its various measures. These discussions generate further defences of the philosophical centrality of human well-being to health services.
Department of Philosophy, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.
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Moore
D026686:Beneficence; D032921:Consensus; D018864:Cultural Diversity; D028781:Ethical Relativism; D028663:Ethical Theory; D006262:Health; D006296:Health Services / Q000592:standards*; D006801:Humans; D026706:Paternalism; D018579:Patient Selection; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D010686:Philosophy, Medical; D040841:Resource Allocation; D018570:Risk Assessment; D012935:Social Justice; D012941:Social Responsibility; D012945:Social Values