Optimal medical treatment under asymmetric information.
A model is developed of patient-doctor interaction under asymmetric information. It examines how both the probability of consulting and initial health status are semi-endogenously determined by a potential patient determining a threshold health level, below which he demands a consultation. It is shown that the demand elasticity with respect to socio-economic variables is lower the more severe the illness. The paper also offers a model of the supply side. A distinction is established between uncertainty and asymmetric information between the patient and the doctor. After deriving the conditions for an equilibrium of the patient-doctor interaction, payment systems for achieving medical 'adequacy' and Pareto efficiency are analysed.
Lee
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Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, Heslington, UK.
D006301:Health Services Needs and Demand / Q000191:economics*; D006304:Health Status; D006801:Humans; D007723:Korea; D018803:Models, Economic; D010342:Patient Acceptance of Health Care / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D010353:Patient Education as Topic; D010817:Physician-Patient Relations; D012017:Referral and Consultation; D012959:Socioeconomic Factors; D013222:State Medicine; D006113:United Kingdom