title: Health insurance: the tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard.
abstract: Choosing optimal health insurance coverage involves a trade-off between the gain from risk reduction and the deadweight loss from moral hazard. This paper examines this trade-off empirically by estimating both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. It relies on data from a randomized controlled trial of cost-sharing's effects on the use of health services and on the health status for a general, non-elderly population.
authors.affiliation: School of Public Health, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis 55455, USA.
authors.forename: W G
authors.initials: WG
authors.lastname: Manning
authors.forename: M S
authors.initials: MS
authors.lastname: Marquis
mesh_terms: D000206:Actuarial Analysis; D001294:Attitude to Health; D017047:Cost Sharing / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D003669:Deductibles and Coinsurance; D006301:Health Services Needs and Demand / Q000191:economics / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D006302:Health Services Research / Q000379:methods; D006304:Health Status; D006801:Humans; D015271:Insurance Pools; D007348:Insurance, Health / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D017059:Models, Econometric; D012306:Risk; D014481:United States