title: Hospital-insurer bargaining: an empirical investigation of appendectomy pricing.
abstract: Employers' increased sensitivity to health care costs has forced insurers to seek ways to lower costs through effective bargaining with providers. What factors determine the prices negotiated between hospitals and insurers? The hospital-insurer interaction is captured in the context of a bargaining model, in which the gains from bargaining are explicitly defined. Appendectomy was chosen because it is a well-defined procedure with little clinical variation. Our results show that certain hospital institutional arrangements (e.g. hospital affiliations), HMO penetration, and greater hospital concentration improve hospitals' bargaining position. Furthermore, hospitals' bargaining effectiveness has diminished over time and varies across states.
authors.affiliation: University of Iowa, College of Pharmacy, Iowa City 55242, USA.
authors.forename: J M
authors.initials: JM
authors.lastname: Brooks
authors.forename: A
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Dor
authors.forename: H S
authors.initials: HS
authors.lastname: Wong
mesh_terms: D001062:Appendectomy / Q000191:economics*; D003363:Cost Control; D003625:Data Collection; D017049:Employer Health Costs; D006264:Health Benefit Plans, Employee / Q000191:economics*; D006302:Health Services Research; D017722:Hospital Charges; D006801:Humans; D007349:Insurance, Health, Reimbursement; D017059:Models, Econometric; D017008:Negotiating; D011907:Rate Setting and Review; D014481:United States