Dynamic competition as an exploratory model of healthcare policy for the antihypertensive market.
Dynamic competition based on innovation, rather than classical competition based on price, may better explain the research-intensive pharmaceutical market. In an exploratory comparison of these models, economic indicators of annual change in price and price elasticity of demand were tested in a repeated-measures design by analysis of variance. Between 1990 and 1992, updated US prescribing guidelines for hypertension provided a framework in which the contrast between 2 newer classes and 2 older classes of first-line therapies served as a marker for innovation. The principal hypothesis was that newer classes would be less elastic than older classes, but with such innovation-based differences eroding over time. Although temporarily greater inelasticities for newer classes supported dynamic competition, initially extreme inelasticities for newer classes indicated a market distortion or a shifting demand curve. These exploratory results, although requiring substantiation, point toward using dynamic competition in crafting healthcare policy for the pharmaceutical market.
Bonk
R J
RJ
Department of Pharmacy Practice and Pharmacy Administration, Philadelphia College of Pharmacy and Science, Pennsylvania, USA.
Myers
M J
MJ
Knowlton
C H
CH
Sabapathi
D
D
McGhan
W F
WF
D000704:Analysis of Variance; D000959:Antihypertensive Agents / Q000145:classification / Q000191:economics* / Q000627:therapeutic use; D003132:Commerce; D003365:Costs and Cost Analysis; D004345:Drug Industry / Q000191:economics; D017408:Guidelines as Topic; D006291:Health Policy / Q000191:economics*; D006801:Humans; D006973:Hypertension / Q000188:drug therapy / Q000191:economics; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D014481:United States