Decision making in quasi-markets: a pedagogic analysis.
The objective of the 1991 NHS reforms was to reduce "excessive" vertical integration by constructing a quasi-market in which incentive structures and increased availability of information would enable decision makers make better use of resources. There is, however, no overall framework in which to consider the welfare gains which result from the introduction of a quasi-market or the welfare losses which arise from distortions in a quasi-market. This paper offers an analysis which can be applied to illustrate the difficulty of estimating the welfare loss from cream skimming and also to consider the impact of local monopoly.
Jones
P R
PR
School of Social Sciences, University of Bath, UK.
Cullis
J G
JG
D002017:Budgets; D017046:Cost Savings; D003659:Decision Making, Organizational; D004465:Economic Competition / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D005194:Family Practice / Q000191:economics; D015276:Health Care Rationing / Q000191:economics* / Q000458:organization & administration / Q000592:standards; D018166:Health Care Reform / Q000191:economics* / Q000458:organization & administration / Q000592:standards; D006302:Health Services Research; D015273:Insurance Selection Bias; D018803:Models, Economic; D011332:Privatization / Q000191:economics; D012052:Reimbursement, Incentive; D012946:Social Welfare / Q000191:economics; D013222:State Medicine / Q000191:economics* / Q000458:organization & administration / Q000592:standards; D011795:Surveys and Questionnaires; D016312:Treatment Refusal; D006113:United Kingdom