title: Persons and their copies.
abstract: Is cloning human beings morally wrong? The basis for the one serious objection to cloning is that, because of what a clone is, clones would have much worse lives than non-clones. I sketch a fragment of moral theory to make sense of the objection. I then outline several ways in which it might be claimed that, because of what a clone is, clones would have much worse lives than non-clones. In particular, I look at various ideas connected with autonomy. I conclude that there is no basis to the claim that, because of what a clone is, clones would have much worse lives than non-clones. I therefore reject the claim that cloning human beings is morally wrong.
authors.affiliation: University of Melbourne, Royal Children's Hospital, Australia.
authors.forename: D
authors.initials: D
authors.lastname: McCarthy
mesh_terms: D019976:Cloning, Organism; D028663:Ethical Theory; D004992:Ethics, Medical; D005260:Female; D005610:Freedom; D033141:Genetic Determinism; D030661:Genetic Privacy; D005824:Genetics, Behavioral; D006806:Human Rights; D006801:Humans; D009014:Morals; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D028723:Personhood; D011247:Pregnancy