Human cloning and child welfare.
In this paper we discuss an objection to human cloning which appeals to the welfare of the child. This objection varies according to the sort of harm it is expected the clone will suffer. The three formulations of it that we will consider are: 1. Clones will be harmed by the fearful or prejudicial attitudes people may have about or towards them (H1); 2. Clones will be harmed by the demands and expectations of parents or genotype donors (H2); 3. Clones will be harmed by their own awareness of their origins, for example the knowledge that the genetic donor is a stranger (H3). We will show why these three versions of the child welfare objection do not necessarily supply compelling reasons to ban human reproductive cloning. The claim that we will develop and defend in the course of our discussion is that even if it is the case that a cloned child will suffer harms of the type H1-H3, it is none the less permissible to conceive by cloning so long as these cloning-induced welfare deficits are not such as to blight the existence of the resultant child, whoever this may be.
Burley
J
J
University of Manchester.
Harris
J
J
D000223:Adaptation, Psychological; D000293:Adolescent; D002648:Child; D002669:Child Welfare; D019976:Cloning, Organism; D004992:Ethics, Medical; D005260:Female; D033161:Government Regulation; D006801:Humans; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D011247:Pregnancy; D011287:Prejudice; D011788:Quality of Life