Tax policy toward health insurance and the demand for medical services.
Researchers have argued that the tax subsidy to employer-provided health insurance has led to overinsurance, excess demand for medical care, and to rapid expenditure growth in the medical care sector. This paper determines the quantitative significance of this linkage, using existing estimates of the elasticities of demand for health insurance and medical services in a static microsimulation model. We find that incorrect assumptions about the elasticities of demand and pattern of health insurance coverage led earlier researchers to overestimate the likely impact of the elimination of the tax expenditures for health insurance. We estimate, using mid-range assumptions, that complete elimination of the favorable tax treatment of employer contributions to health insurance would reduce the demand for employer-sponsored health insurance by 16-27 percent and the overall demand for medical services by about 4-6 percent and not more than 10 percent.
D003625:Data Collection; D006264:Health Benefit Plans, Employee / Q000191:economics*; D006301:Health Services Needs and Demand; D006302:Health Services Research; D007348:Insurance, Health / Q000191:economics*; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D013660:Taxes / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D014481:United States