Optimal reimbursement health insurance and the theory of Ramsey taxation.
This paper explores the trade-off between risk sharing and the incentives to consume increased medical care inherent in reimbursement insurance. The results for the theory of reimbursement insurance are compared with those on Ramsey taxation. It is shown that there is a close formal analogy and interpretations are given.
D005102:Health Expenditures; D006301:Health Services Needs and Demand / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D006302:Health Services Research / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D007182:Income; D007348:Insurance, Health / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D015233:Models, Statistical; D012051:Reimbursement Mechanisms; D012052:Reimbursement, Incentive; D012307:Risk Factors; D013660:Taxes / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D006113:United Kingdom; D014481:United States