title: Market power and hospital pricing: are nonprofits different?
abstract: Dramatic changes in hospitals' operating environments are leading to major restructuring of hospital organizations. Hospital mergers and acquisitions are increasing each year, and conversions by hospitals to different forms of ownership also are continuing apace. Such changes require policymakers and regulators to develop and implement policies to ensure that consumers' interests are protected. An important consideration in this process is the impact on the price of hospital care following such transactions. This paper reviews empirical evidence that mergers that reduce competition will lead to price increases at both merging hospitals and their competitors, regardless of ownership status. We show that nonprofit and government hospitals have steadily become more willing to raise prices to exploit market power and discuss the implications for antitrust regulators and agencies that must approve nonprofit conversions.
authors.affiliation: University of Southern California, USA.
authors.forename: G
authors.initials: G
authors.lastname: Melnick
authors.forename: E
authors.initials: E
authors.lastname: Keeler
authors.forename: J
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Zwanziger
mesh_terms: D004465:Economic Competition / Q000458:organization & administration*; D019981:Health Care Sector; D006273:Health Facility Merger / Q000191:economics* / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D006291:Health Policy; D017722:Hospital Charges / Q000706:statistics & numerical data / Q000639:trends*; D006779:Hospitals, Public / Q000191:economics / Q000458:organization & administration; D006788:Hospitals, Voluntary / Q000191:economics* / Q000458:organization & administration; D006801:Humans; D017059:Models, Econometric; D010067:Ownership / Q000191:economics; D012044:Regression Analysis; D014481:United States