Committee proposals and restrictive rules.
I analyze a game-theoretic model of committee-legislature interaction in which a majority decision to adopt either an open or closed amendment rule occurs following the committee's proposal of a bill. I find that, in equilibrium, the closed rule is almost always chosen when the dimension of the policy space is >1. Furthermore, the difference between the equilibrium outcome and that which would have occurred under the open rule can be arbitrarily small.
Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA.
J S
JS
Banks
D005716:Game Theory; D006077:Government Agencies; D006801:Humans; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D007878:Legislation as Topic; D008960:Models, Psychological; D015233:Models, Statistical; D011057:Politics; D014481:United States