Committee proposals and restrictive rules.
I analyze a game-theoretic model of committee-legislature interaction in which a majority decision to adopt either an open or closed amendment rule occurs following the committee's proposal of a bill. I find that, in equilibrium, the closed rule is almost always chosen when the dimension of the policy space is >1. Furthermore, the difference between the equilibrium outcome and that which would have occurred under the open rule can be arbitrarily small.
Banks
J S
JS
Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA.
D005716:Game Theory; D006077:Government Agencies; D006801:Humans; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D007878:Legislation as Topic; D008960:Models, Psychological; D015233:Models, Statistical; D011057:Politics; D014481:United States