Exploring the process of inference generation in sarcasm: a review of normal and clinical studies.
This article evaluates two theoretical accounts of how sarcasm is understood; the traditional model, which asserts that listeners derive a counterfactual inference from the sarcastic comment, and relevance theory, which asserts that listeners recognize sarcasm as a scornful echo of a previous assertion. Evidence from normal speakers provides only partial support for both theories. Evidence from brain-injured populations suggests that aspects of the pragmatic process can be arrested in ways not predicted by either theory. It is concluded that sarcasm is more effortful to process than nonsarcastic comments and that inferences about the facts of the situation and the mental state of the speaker (e.g., attitudes, knowledge, and intentions) are important to comprehending sarcasm. It is questioned whether inferences about mental state are relatively more difficult for brain-injured subjects and, if so, whether this is a continuum of difficulty or reflects reliance upon different cognitive processes.
McDonald
S
S
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia.
D001927:Brain Diseases / Q000150:complications; D003072:Cognition Disorders / Q000209:etiology; D003463:Cues; D006801:Humans; D008037:Linguistics; D013060:Speech; D013064:Speech Disorders / Q000209:etiology