Philosophical behaviorism: a review of things that happen because they should: a teleological approach to action, by Rowland Stout.
Mentalistic terms such as belief and desire have been rejected by behavior analysts because they are traditionally held to refer to unobservable events inside the organism. Behavior analysis has consequently been viewed by philosophers to be at best irrelevant to psychology, understood as a science of the mind. In this book, the philosopher Rowland Stout argues cogently that beliefs and desires (like operants such as rats' lever presses) are best understood in terms of an interaction over time between overt behavior and its overt consequences (a viewpoint called teleological behaviorism). This book is important because it identifies the science of the mind with the science of overt behavior and implies that the psychologists best equipped to study mental life are not those who purport to do so but those who focus on the experimental analysis of behavior.
Rachlin
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Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Stony Brook 11794-2500, USA. hrachlin@psych1.psy.sunysb.edu
D000818:Animals; D001527:Behaviorism; D003216:Conditioning, Operant; D006801:Humans; D010684:Philosophy; D011589:Psychology, Experimental; D051381:Rats