title: The continuous prisoner's dilemma: I. linear reactive strategies.
abstract: We present a general model for the Prisoner's Dilemma in which variable degrees of cooperation are possible, and payoffs are scaled accordingly. We describe a continuous strategy space, and divide this space into strategy families. We derive the payoff function for these families analytically, and study the evolutionary outcome when a wide range of strategies play against each other. Our results show that the initial degree of cooperation offered by a strategy is a decisive factor for evolutionary robustness: the most successful strategies in our model offer full cooperation as an initial move, but thereafter cooperate fully only if their opponent does the same. These strategies gradually raise the stakes when playing a strategy which is initially reticent to cooperate, but differ from the strategies predicted by other continuous models in that they are not only generous, but are also consistently optimistic and uncompromising.
authors.affiliation: Institute for Advanced Study, Olden Lane, Princeton, NJ, 08540, USA.
authors.forename: L M
authors.initials: LM
authors.lastname: Wahl
authors.forename: M A
authors.initials: MA
authors.lastname: Nowak
mesh_terms: D005075:Biological Evolution; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D008954:Models, Biological