Biological preparedness and evolutionary explanation.
It is commonly supposed that evolutionary explanations of cognitive phenomena involve the assumption that the capacities to be explained are both innate and modular. This is understandable: independent selection of a trait requires that it be both heritable and largely decoupled from other 'nearby' traits. Cognitive capacities realized as innate modules would certainly satisfy these contraints. A viable evolutionary cognitive psychology, however, requires neither extreme nativism nor modularity, though it is consistent with both. In this paper, we seek to show that rather weak assumptions about innateness and modularity are consistent with evolutionary explanations of cognitive capacities. Evolutionary pressures can affect the degree to which the development of a capacity is canalized by biasing acquisition/learning in ways that favor development of concepts and capacities that proved adaptive to an organism's ancestors.
Dellarosa Cummins
D
D
Philosophy Department, University of California, Davis 95616, USA. dcummins@ucdavies.edu
Cummins
R
R
D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D003071:Cognition / Q000502:physiology; D006801:Humans; D007858:Learning / Q000502:physiology; D012931:Social Environment