title: Cheating as a mixed strategy in a simple model of aggressive communication.
abstract: The possibility that frequency-dependent cheating can persist in an evolutionarily stable communication system has frequently been proposed. Although there is empirical evidence for this idea, however, it has not been investigated in terms of game theory. In the present paper I show for a simple symmetric game that cheating can be part of a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Furthermore, despite the widespread assumption that cheaters must be rare, I show that most of the population can be cheaters, while the signalling system remains evolutionarily stable. Consequences for signalling theory and experiments to detect such mixed ESS are discussed. Copyright 2000 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.
authors.affiliation: Department of Plant Taxonomy and Ecology, Eötvös Lorand University, Budapest
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Számadó