title: Hospital mergers: the shift from federal antitrust enforcement to state regulation.
abstract: The authors examine and analyze the burgeoning merger activity in the hospital arena, as well as the nonfederal attempts made to regulate that activity. They conclude that the present, ad hoc, system of state regulation is sorely wanting and that it would be preferable if stronger antitrust enforcement and judical decisions prevented competition reducing mergers. If a merger results in a true monopoly (and nonetheless passes antitrust scrutiny), its regulation should be the responsibility of the pertinent state public utility board which, unlike the courts and state attorneys general, has sufficient expertise to adequately regulate the merged entities. Otherwise, the faults of the present system, which is easily manipulated by hospitals seeking political and legal cover for their activities, are likely to be perpetuated.
authors.affiliation: Temple University, USA.
authors.forename: E A
authors.initials: EA
authors.lastname: Blackstone
authors.forename: J P
authors.initials: JP
authors.lastname: Fuhr
mesh_terms: D016363:Antitrust Laws; D004465:Economic Competition / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D006273:Health Facility Merger / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D006788:Hospitals, Voluntary / Q000191:economics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D013219:State Government; D014481:United States