title: Nas-Walras equilibria of a large economy.
abstract: Individuals exchange contracts for the delivery of commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directly or through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information. Nash-Walras equilibria exist for large economies, even if utility functions are not quasi-concave and choice sets are not convex, which is the case in standard settings; the separation of the purchase from the sale of contracts and the pooling of the deliveries on contracts guarantee that the markets for commodities clear.
authors.affiliation: Department of Economics, Universita di Brescia, I-25122 Brescia, Italy.
authors.forename: E
authors.initials: E
authors.lastname: Minelli
authors.forename: H M
authors.initials: HM
authors.lastname: Polemarchakis