A neurofunctional theory of visual consciousness.
This paper develops an empirically motivated theory of visual consciousness. It begins by outlining neuropsychological support for Jackendoff's (1987) hypothesis that visual consciousness involves mental representations at an intermediate level of processing. It then supplements that hypothesis with the further requirement that attention, which can come under the direction of high level representations, is also necessary for consciousness. The resulting theory is shown to have a number of philosophical consequences. If correct, higher-order thought accounts, the multiple drafts account, and the widely held belief that sensation precedes perception will all be found wanting. The theory will also be used to illustrate and defend a methodology that fills the gulf between functionalists who ignore the brain and neural reductionists who repudiate functionalism.
Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Department of Philosophy, Washington University, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, Missouri, 63130-4899, USA. jesse@twinearth.wustl.edu
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Prinz
D001288:Attention; D003243:Consciousness; D006801:Humans; D007092:Imagination; D008960:Models, Psychological; D014796:Visual Perception