Adverse selection and categorical discrimination in the health insurance markets: the effects of genetic tests.
In this paper, the effects of new methods for risk classification, e.g., genetic tests, on health insurance markets are studied using an insurance model with state contingent utility functions. The analysis focuses on the case of treatment costs higher than the patient's willingness to pay where standard models of asymmetric information are not applicable. In this case, the benefit from signing a fair insurance contract will be positive only if illness probability is low. In contrast to the common perception, additional risk classification under symmetric information can be efficiency enhancing. Under asymmetric information about illness risks, however, there can be complete market failure.
Strohmenger
R
R
Economics Department, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München, Germany.
Wambach
A
A
D005820:Genetic Testing; D006305:Health Status Indicators; D019458:Insurance Coverage / Q000458:organization & administration*; D007348:Insurance, Health / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D011287:Prejudice; D018570:Risk Assessment / Q000706:statistics & numerical data