Why commercial surrogate motherhood unethically commodifies women and children: reply to McLachlan and Swales.
McLachlan and Swales dispute my arguments against commercial surrogate motherhood. In reply, I argue that commercial surrogate contracts objectionably commodify children because they regard parental rights over children not as trusts, to be allocated in the best interests of the child, but as like property rights, to be allocated at the will of the parents. They also express disrespect for mothers, by compromising their inalienable right to act in the best interest of their children, when this interest calls for mothers to assert a custody right in their children.
Anderson
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Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA. eandersn@umich.edu
D002648:Child; D003132:Commerce; D032821:Commodification; D032982:Contracts; D004992:Ethics, Medical; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D008297:Male; D011247:Pregnancy; D011640:Public Policy; D013533:Gestational Carriers / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*