title: On the dynamic persistence of cooperation: how lower individual fitness induces higher survivability.
abstract: We study a model in which cooperation and defection coexist in a dynamical steady state. In our model, subpopulations of cooperators and defectors inhabit sites on a lattice. The interactions among the individuals at a site, in the form of a prisoner's dilemma (PD) game, determine their fitnesses. The chosen PD payoff allows cooperators, but not defectors, to maintain a homogeneous population. Individuals mutate between types and migrate to neighboring sites with low probabilities. We consider both density-dependent and density-independent versions of the model. The persistence of cooperation in this model can be explained in terms of the life cycle of a population at a site. This life cycle starts when one cooperator establishes a population. Then defectors invade and eventually take over, resulting finally in the death of the population. During this life cycle, single cooperators migrate to empty neighboring sites to found new cooperator populations. The system can reach a steady state where cooperation prevails if the global "birth" rate of populations is equal to their global "death" rate. The dynamic persistence of cooperation ranges over a large section of the model's parameter space. We compare these dynamics to those from other models for the persistence of altruism and to predator-prey models.
authors.affiliation: School of Mathematics, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv 69978, Israel.
authors.forename: G
authors.initials: G
authors.lastname: Sella
authors.forename: M
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Lachmann
mesh_terms: D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D008960:Models, Psychological; D013534:Survival