title: Nonatomic games on Loeb spaces.
abstract: In the setting of noncooperative game theory, strategic negligibility of individual agents, or diffuseness of information, has been modeled as a nonatomic measure space, typically the unit interval endowed with Lebesgue measure. However, recent work has shown that with uncountable action sets, for example the unit interval, there do not exist pure-strategy Nash equilibria in such nonatomic games. In this brief announcement, we show that there is a perfectly satisfactory existence theory for nonatomic games provided this nonatomicity is formulated on the basis of a particular class of measure spaces, hyperfinite Loeb spaces. We also emphasize other desirable properties of games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces, and present a synthetic treatment, embracing both large games as well as those with incomplete information.
authors.affiliation: Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218.
authors.forename: M A
authors.initials: MA
authors.lastname: Khan
authors.forename: Y
authors.initials: Y
authors.lastname: Sun